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Abstract 
The literature on multinationality-performance relationship has been limited to multinational firms from 
developed economies, and previous studies generally disregard the effects of location and ownership 
structure. This paper seeks to explain this relationship in the emerging market context, highlighting the 
importance of location decisions and ownership structure. We use panel data that include 2258 
multinationals from 25 emerging economies over a period of 2004-2013. We find a significant positive 
relationship between multinationality and performance. In particular, investment in developed countries 
rather than developing countries has a significant positive impact on firm performance. Private owned 
enterprise has a better performance in foreign markets than state owned enterprise. These results indicate 
that emerging markets firms can improve performance by investing abroad and the better location choice 
is developed countries. In addition, firms with different ownership structure should have different 
internationalisation strategies. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
The relationship between multinationality and firm performance remains an important research issue 
for business scholars over the past three decades (Majocchi & Strange, 2012; Yang & Driffield, 2012). 
Multinational enterprises (MNEs) expand operations across different nations outside their home 
countries, bringing some costs and benefits. On the one hand, internationalisation results in costs such 
as the unfamiliarity with foreign market, huge sunk costs at early internationalization and great 
coordination cost. On the other hand, international expansion benefits firm performance. It helps MNEs 
access cheaper resources, acquire foreign knowledge, realise economies of scale, obtain 
internationalization experience, exploit firm-specific assets in foreign markets and reduce the 
fluctuations of revenue by geographic diversification. Overall, the observed Multinationality-
Performance (MP) relationship is the net effect of these costs and benefits (Contractor, 2007). 
   It is vital to investigate the relationship between emerging market multinationals’ (EMMs) 
international activity and firm performance for two reasons. First, recent years have witnessed a surge 
in foreign direct investment (FDI) outflows from emerging economies. The recent stories about Huawei 
Technologies (China), Infosys (India) and SABMiller (South Africa) attract lots of scholars’ attentions 
(Khanna & Palepu, 2006). According to UNCTAD (2014), The FDI outflows from developed economies 
remain stagnant in the recent years, whose percentage of world FDI outflows dropped from 93% to 61%. 
On the contrary, developing country MNEs are increasingly acquiring firms in developed countries, the 
FDI outflows from developing countries have reached a record level. The share of developing and 
transition economies in world FDI outflows has jumped from 7% in 1999 to 39% in 2013, along with a 
volume of 454 billion US dollars in 2013. Despite the large amount of MP literature, little attention is 
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paid to the emerging market multinationals’ international activity. Second, emerging markets differ 
hugely from the developed economies in terms of institutional environment. The underdeveloped 
institutional environment in emerging economies are not sufficient to support EMMs’ ambitious 
internationalisation initiatives. Besides, emerging market multinationals are believed to have 
constrained resource when comparing their western counterparts. Despite the lack of institutional 
support and resource, emerging market multinationals have made great progress in going abroad 
(Khanna & Palepu, 2006). Hence, it is interesting for scholars to understand why and how emerging 
market multinationals expand globally and subsequently perform.  
   We develop three research questions and hypotheses after reviewing relevant literature. First, 
knowledge on MP relationship has been limited to MNEs from developed economies, while there are 
huge differences between developing and developed countries MNEs. This paper seeks to explain the 
MP relationship in the context of emerging markets by analysing data from emerging market 
multinationals, contributing to the existing MP literature. We expect a priori a positive relationship 
between multinationality and performance for emerging economy MNEs.  
   Second, FDI destination is an important concern of managers in MNEs. According to World 
Investment Report published by UNCTAD (2014), FDI inflows to developed countries rose to 566 
billion US dollars, contributing to 39% of world FDI inflows. FDI inflows to developing and transition 
economies reached 886 billion US dollars which account for 61% of FDI inflow in the world. The extant 
literature pays limited attention to the location choice of host countries, with the exception of some 
studies (Berry, 2006; Pantzalis, 2001), in which location choices are categorised into developed and 
developing countries. We intend to look into whether the returns to multinationality for emerging market 
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multinationals in developing countries are different from that in developed countries. We expect a priori 
that FDI activities in developed economies rather than developing economies have a significant positive 
effect on performance. 
   Third, ownership structure plays an important role in internationalisation and firm performance. Based 
on World Investments Report (UNCTAD, 2014), private equity firms have enormous funds to invest, 
which has reached a record level of at least 1 trillion US dollars. There is huge potential of increased 
FDI from private equity firms. Besides, state-owned MNEs are vital players in worldwide FDI flows. 
Although their number consists of less than 1 per cent of all MNEs in the world, their FDI comprises 
more than 11 per cent of worldwide FDI flows, reaching 160 billion US dollars in 2013. Ownership 
structure that has been rarely studied in previous MP studies is emphasized in this paper. This paper 
attempts to investigate whether the ownership structure (private ownership vs. state ownership) 
moderates the MP relationship for emerging market multinationals. We expect a priori that private 
owned enterprises (POE) perform better than state owned enterprise (SOE). We provide a detailed 
discussion of the development for the above three hypotheses in the next section. 
   Overall, this research does not only take into account factors in host country (host country economic 
development), but also considers factors in home country (domestic institutional environment), both of 
which may affect returns to FDI for emerging market multinationals. 
   Most of previous MP studies use cross-sectional rather than longitudinal data. It is argued that 
international business scholar should increase the use of longitudinal data to better understand the 
relative change of a MNE’s internationalisation over time (Hennart, 2007). We collect time series cross-
sectional data given our access to a huge dataset Orbis, which includes emerging economy companies’ 
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financial and operational data. The panel data analysis allows us to relate the changes in performance to 
the changes in multinationality within firms over time. Our panel data contain 2258s MNEs from 25 
emerging economies over a period from 2004 to 2013. 
   We find a positive linear relationship between multinationality and performance, which is consistent 
with previous related studies (Goerzen & Beamish, 2003; Kim et al., 1993; Zahra et al., 2000). In terms 
of location choice for FDI, we find that investing in developed countries rather than developing countries 
leads to significant improvement of firm performance. Regarding ownership structure’s effect on the 
relationship between multinationality and performance, we find that POEs perform better than SOEs 
when going abroad. They also have different performance in different FDI locations. Our suggestions 
for managers of emerging market multinationals consist of three parts. First, emerging market 
multinationals are advised to invest abroad to enhance their performance, enjoying the large benefits 
that exceed the costs of multinationality. Second, the better FDI location strategy for emerging market 
multinationals is the expansion in developed countries. Finally, POEs are advised to establish more 
subsidiaries in developed countries. SOEs may not make profit from investing abroad, no matter in 
either developed or developing countries. 
   The structure of this paper is as the following. After introduction section, we provide a comprehensive 
review of the relevant literature and develop hypotheses. Section 3 discusses the theoretical framework 
and methodology. Section 4 presents and discusses the descriptive statistics and regression results. The 
final section provides conclusions and limitations. 
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2. THEORY DEVELOPMENT AND HYPOTHESES 
2.1 The Relationship between Multinationality and Performance 
International business scholars employ some well-known theories to explain the relationship between 
multinationality and performance. Previous empirical studies provide mixed evidences of the MP 
relationship. These studies differ from each other many aspects, such as sampling, measurement of key 
variables, moderators or control variables and results. 
Multinationality and Firm Performance.   There are some costs of doing business in a foreign country 
(Hymer, 1976). The liability of foreignness can result from many aspects, such as increased coordination 
cost due to greater distance, unfamiliarity with host country environment, lack of local legitimacy and 
some restrictions from home country government (e.g., high-tech export to certain country is restricted 
by US government) (Zaheer & Mosakowski, 1997). Compared with a local new firm, a foreign new 
subsidiary is at a disadvantage in purchasing, staffing and establishing new facilities. The coordination 
and governance costs, surrounded by extensive multinational network, rise with the increased 
multinationality or the number of host countries (Lu & Beamish, 2004). In addition, When operating in 
multiple countries, the differing political institutions, laws, culture and exchange rates add to the 
complexity of coordination issue (Sundaram & Black, 1992).  
   However, internationalisation also provides firms with lots of benefits. Going abroad can help firm 
get access to cheap resources such as law material and labour force, which might be more expensive in 
domestic market (Contractor, 2007). Increased production of products can lead to economies of scale. 
Thus expanding sales by either exporting or investing abroad can let firm benefit from economies of 
scale (Krugman, 1980). MNEs may enjoy the reduced cost per unit of output because the fixed costs 
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and huge R&D expenditure can be spread over a large sale of products, thus achieving cost efficiency. 
According to transaction costs economy, the transaction cost of knowledge is high, since knowledge is 
like a public good and everyone can easily use it without paying for it. The imperfection of the 
knowledge market rise the importance of internalisation. Through internalisation by setting up 
subsidiaries, the firm can transfer the knowledge from innovation centre to production. The effectiveness 
of internalisation depends whether the cost of internalisation is lesser than in the cost of using external 
market (Buckley & Casson, 2003). Based on the learning theory, a firm can learn experience and market-
specific knowledge of foreign market when investing abroad, in an incremental process (e.g., typically 
exporting, then sales subsidiary, then foreign production). This market-specific knowledge can help 
MNE perceive and seize market opportunities, contributing to MNE’s superior performance. Also, the 
knowledge of how to operate in an unfamiliar foreign environment is valuable because the firm can use 
this knowledge to operate in other countries, leading to long-term growth. This market-specific 
knowledge of foreign country is mainly obtained through foreign operation, which is not available to 
domestic company (Johanson & Vahlne, 1977). According to the real option theory. The MNE is like 
portfolio of assets in dispersed countries. The multinational network and operating flexibility provide 
firm with valuable options resulting from different country environments such as differing institutional 
restrictions. The MNE can exercise the options by shifting resource across national borders through its 
multinational network, which cannot be done by a domestic firm (Doukas & Travlos, 1988). Foreign 
operation in a number of countries can reduce the risk of profits if these countries’ economic cycles are 
not perfectly positively correlated (Rugman, 1976). 
   Hennart (2007) adopts transaction cost/internalisation (TCI) model to criticise the theoretical 
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background of MP literature, particularly focus on economies of scale, operational flexibility and 
learning experience. He argue that there is no direct relationship between multinationality and 
performance. However, Contractor (2007) responses to Hennart’s critiques. Contractor contends that 
Hennart’s assumptions about MNE are too stringent and TCI lens provides too limited view, indicating 
alternative perspectives from strategy and IB (international business) literatures. Contractor concludes 
that internationalisation is good for companies.  
   Many previous empirical studies find evidences supporting that international diversification can 
enhance firm performance, suggesting that the benefits of multinationality exceed costs (Goerzen & 
Beamish, 2003; Kim et al., 1993; Ramirez-Aleson & Espitia-Escuer, 2001; Zahra et al., 2000). However, 
the aforementioned argument and results are mainly based on the analysis of developed country MNEs, 
particularly US firms. We need to further discuss whether the results of these MP literature can be 
applied to MNEs that originate from emerging markets. 
MP Relationship and Emerging Market Multinationals.   The above findings of MP relationship 
mainly rely on data from developed country firms. However, researchers question whether these 
findings is applicable to emerging market MNEs, since emerging market contexts are different from 
developed country contexts in terms of institution development. The lack of needed resources and the 
underdeveloped domestic institutional environment do not support firm to go abroad (Gaur & Kumar, 
2009). The weak institutional environment (e.g., legal system) in emerging market encourages non-
market based transactions (Choi et al., 1999). This prevent emerging market multinationals from 
accessing adequate resources through market base transaction at home country. Hitt et al. (2000) argue 
that emerging market multinationals lack sufficient resources (e.g., capital and technology) to compete 
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in the global market place. 
   Emerging market multinationals have a lack of resource and institutional support to favour 
international expansion. However, they still have made outstanding progress in going abroad, using 
serial acquisitions (Elango & Pattnaik, 2011) and accelerated internationalisation (Mathews, 2006). The 
emerging giants from several countries, including Huawei Technologies (China), Infosys (India) and 
SABMiller (South Africa), have attract attentions from scholars and managers (Khanna & Palepu, 2006). 
Considering that emerging market multinationals are late-movers in the internationalisation and are 
known to be less resource-endowed, it is fascinating and interesting for academics to understand why 
and how emerging market multinationals go internationalisation and subsequently perform. 
   Emerging market multinationals are different from traditional western MNEs, in particular the 
motivations of internationalisation (Guillén & Garcia-Canal, 2009). It is argued that one important 
motivation of emerging market multinationals’ overseas investment is to seek strategic assets (Makino 
et al., 2002). As a latecomer, emerging market multinationals have to learn knowledge quickly in order 
to compete in the global economy. And emerging market multinationals do not have sufficient 
capabilities and resource to do greenfield investment. Thus acquisition of strategic assets maybe a 
favourable option for emerging market multinationals. Through foreign investment, emerging market 
multinationals can cope with trade barriers that restrict exporting and provide services that are not 
tradable, thus achieve market expansion (UNCTAD, 2006). In addition, emerging market multinationals 
want to escape the cumbersome transportation due to underinvestment of infrastructure in home country 
(Guillén & Garcia-Canal, 2009). Emerging market multinationals could rapidly overcome liabilities of 
foreignness by acquiring the existing brand, technology and managerial capabilities possessed by local 
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firms in host countries (Elango & Pattnaik, 2011). 
   Although emerging market multinationals have lesser resources and developed from weaker 
institutional environment before foreign expansion when comparing with western counterparts, 
emerging market multinationals have its own advantages to overcome the liabilities of foreignness when 
entering the overseas market (Gaur & Kumar, 2009). First, the failure in capital, labour and product 
market create many institutional voids, as a result of weak institution environment in emerging market. 
Business group affiliation can imitate the institution by creating internal market for finance, labour and 
intermediate goods, thus filling the institutional voids (Khanna & Palepu, 1997). Therefore, emerging 
market multinationals may have easier access to the shared financial and managerial resources within 
the same business group, which help emerging market multinationals endure the initial high cost of 
internationalisation. Second, Governments play a vital role in many emerging economies. These 
government are very supportive on outward FDI. For instance, the China’s government provide firms 
going abroad with privilege access to subsidies, tax reduction and favourable bank loan (Cai, 1999). The 
government’s support might help emerging market multinationals offset the ownership disadvantages in 
overseas markets. Third, emerging market multinationals has networking ability to build beneficial 
relationship within and outside of firm. This facilitate the access to resource control by others, which is 
also called relational assets (Dunning, 2002). For instance, emerging market multinationals’ sales can 
benefit from affinities with ethnic network in host country (Lecraw, 1977). Fourth, emerging market 
multinationals are described as “latecomer MNEs” who catch up and achieve accelerated 
internationalisation through organisational innovation. They go through the internationalisation process 
very quickly, using much lesser time than traditional western counterparts (Mathews, 2006). As a 
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latecomer, the early adoption of new technology developed by other help emerging market 
multinationals compete with western MNEs, particularly in infrastructure industry (UNCTAD, 2006). 
Emerging market multinationals can adapt the available technology to small-scale and labour-intensive 
production, producing low-cost goods (Lecraw, 1977). 
   To sum up, in spite of the constraint resource and limited institutional support, emerging market 
multinationals have their own advantages such as the acquisition of foreign strategic assets, business 
group affiliations, government support, relational assets and the implication of catch-up strategy. Such 
that, emerging market multinationals realise the benefits of multinationality quickly, which outweigh 
the costs of multinationality. Thereby, emerging market multinationals enhance firm performance 
through overseas investments. 
Hypothesis 1: There is a positive relationship between multinationality and performance.  
 
We consider the possibility that emerging market multinationals may make loss due to huge set-up cost 
at initial internationalisation stage and experience negative performance resulting from accelerating 
coordination costs when internationalise too much. Hence, we will test the non-linear relationship by 
introducing the second and third term of multinationality measure in the empirical model (Contractor, 
2007). Thus, we will test the non-linear relationship by introducing second term and third term of 
multinationality in our empirical models. 
 
2.2 Location Choice 
The majority of the MP literature focus on the discussion of costs and benefits resulting from 
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internationalisation, while ignoring the importance of location decision (Beugelsdijk et al., 2010). 
Location plays a crucial role on MNE’s multinational performance (Dunning, 1988). (Doukas & Travlos, 
1988)’s results indicate that if a US MNE acquire a firm in the unfamiliar country, this cross-border 
acquisition can improve the value of the MNE, suggesting that good location choice can enhance firm 
performance. 
   For most MP studies, to draw a conclusion of MP relationship, they regress performance measure on 
different proxies of multinationality measure. However, the literature generally use an aggregate 
measures to examine the multinationality, ignoring the important of location (Yang et al., 2013). 
Insufficient attention paid to connecting firms’ organisational characteristics with geographical 
characteristics is the main weakness of the convergence of three location-based literature, including 
international trade, economic geography, strategy and international business (Beugelsdijk et al., 2010). 
For the few papers (Berry, 2006; Pantzalis, 2001) that examine the role of location on MP relationship, 
they consider the differences between developed and developing countries, since there are huge 
dissimilarity between developed and developing countries in terms of economic development, resource 
endowment, risk, culture and institutional environment. 
   In terms of economic development, developing countries have relatively low GDP and most of the 
population are low income customers. Developed countries, however, have high GDP, as well as high-
income and demanding customers (Qian et al., 2008). Firm can gain competitive advantage through 
faster innovation to meet advanced customer needs (Porter, 1990). With respect to resource endowment, 
most developing countries have cheap labour force and nature resource (Berry, 2006), which may 
overlap the resources in emerging countries. While developed countries have the technology and 
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knowledge resources which are rare in emerging countries (Martins & Yang, 2009) and essential to the 
enhancement of emerging market multinationals intangible assets.  
   Concerning the risk and dissimiliarity within the same country group. The developing countries have 
high risk (Berry, 2006) and and huge disimilarity (e.g., culture, political and economic system) among 
countries (Qian et al., 2008). The risks include financial risk such as fluctuating exchange rate, political 
risk such as the frequently changing government policies, and troublesome infrastructure. In some 
extreme cases, the expropriation of foreign investment might happen. The developed countries, 
nevertheless, have low risk and share many similarity within this country group (Berry, 2006). They 
tend to have relatively more stable currency values and government policies. The government 
intervention in the market is likely to be small. Hence, if emerging market multinationals expand into 
various developing countries, they will face the huge risk and large diversity among these countires, 
resulting in larger transaction costs. Diversification into a moderate number of developed countries 
(Qian et al., 2008), however, can let emerging market multinationals face lower risk and similar market 
environment of these countries (Berry, 2006). 
   Regarding institutional environment, developing countries have weak institutional environment, while 
developed countries have strong institutional support on investment, particularly the intellectual 
property rights protection in legal system. Hence, investing in developed countries, emerging market 
multinationals can enjoy the better institutional environment which is not available in domestic market. 
Emerging market multinationals have the opportunity to develop their own technological capability and 
intangible assets in this strong institutional environment of developed countries, where is nearly 
impossible in home country context where the poor intellectual property enforcement discourage the 
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emerging market multinationals from investing in R&D and creating new products (Gaur & Kumar, 
2009). 
   Location matters when considering the differences between developed and developing country 
groupings. It is argue that due to the risker investment environment in developing countries than in 
developed countries, only when emerging market multinationals obtain enough experience from 
previous overseas investment about how to hedge the risk and uncertainty in foreign operation, can they 
enjoy the value increase of geographic diversification in developing countries (Berry, 2006). 
   Overall, different location decisions have different impacts on emerging market multinationals’ 
international performance. One the one hand, developing countries have some cheap input such as 
labour and raw materials, but which may overlap the resources in emerging countries. Besides, the high 
risk, huge dissimilarity within developing country grouping and weak institutional environment lead to 
the large liabilities of foreignness when emerging market multinationals enter various developing 
countries. Developed countries, one the other hand, have demanding customers that force firm to 
innovate rapidly, abundant technological resource, similar market environments within developed 
country grouping, strong institutional protection on investment and intellectual property. This help 
emerging market multinationals gain competitive advantage, hedge the risk, overcome the liabilities of 
foreignness, protect their investment, learn and exploit knowledge in foreign market. 
Hypothesis 2: The returns to multinationality are significantly positive when investing in 
developed countries rather than developing countries. 
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2.3 Ownership Structure Effects 
The final concern of our paper is the ownership structure on MP relationship, which is rarely examined 
in the extant MP literature. Not only location choice plays an important role on firm’s international 
performance, but also ownership structure can affect MNE’s performance (Al-Obaidan & Scully, 1993). 
The MNE’s feature of multinational network indicate that the firm can be affected by the institutional 
environment at home and host countries (Xu & Shenkar, 2002). Since developed country MNEs are 
more likely to act as autonomous economic entities, prior studies concentrate on their deal with host 
country environment (X. Lin, 2010). However, given the historical absence of market economy in 
emerging market, when analysing the emerging market multinationals’ internationalisation process, one 
has to focus more on the role of domestic institutional environment on emerging market multinationals 
(Child & Rodrigues, 2005). The state is not only the formal institution, but also the key actor in an 
economy, as it is regulating business and economy (Okhmatovskiy, 2010). The institutional factor plays 
a vital role on the internationalisation strategy of MNEs from emerging markets such as China. The state 
affect the economy through governmental intervention in the market and involvement in firm’s 
ownership. The state ownership play an institutional role of the government on firm’s operation (Child 
& Rodrigues, 2005). As a result of economic reform, the number of private firms are increasing. Some 
of them are firms that are privatised from SOEs and some are new firms created by entrepreneurs. The 
private sector is growing rapidly and contributes to a significant portion the economy. Besides, although 
the number of SOEs is shrinking, SOE still contribute to a considerable portion of output in emerging 
countries such as China. Both POEs and SOEs are increasingly engaging in internationalisation 
activities (Ralston et al., 2006). Hence, it is interesting to understand the different effects of state 
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ownership and private counterpart on international process. 
   There are many differences between POEs (private owned enterprises) and SOEs in the 
internationalisation process. The first one is the motivation of internationalisation. One could argue that 
SOEs tend to be internationalised by government’s pressure, while POEs’ internationalisation activities 
tend to be motivated by economic reasons, suggesting that POE internationalise for value-adding 
activity (X. Lin, 2010). Different motivations could lead to the different reaction of investors. Investors 
are usually more cautious about foreign acquisitions of firms that have state ownership, since 
government are believed to be in the lack of effectiveness. Compared with POEs, SOEs are suffering 
from poorer image of corporate governance, resulting in the investor’s negative reaction toward SOEs 
international acquisitions (Chen & Young, 2010). In addition, state ownership of the firm create poor 
political image, triggering politicians and public’s negative reaction in host countries. Thus, SOEs’ FDI 
projects or acquisitions are more likely to be restricted by host country government, leading to enlarged 
liabilities of foreignness (Cui & Jiang, 2012).  
   In terms of corporate governance structure, the state owners are less motivated to monitor SOEs’ 
performance, while managers of POEs are more active in making personal interest in line with firm’s 
interest. The separation of control and cash flow rights create serious agency problem in SOEs. The 
central or local government own cash flow such as dividends, while a variety of government agencies 
control and manage SOEs. The state owners have a lack of incentives and capabilities to closely monitor 
SOE managers’ behaviour (Zou & Adams, 2008). SOE managers are less likely to pursue long-term 
opportunities such as purchasing foreign strategic assets, since their promotion is tied to the achievement 
of firm’s political or economic goal within the tenure (N. Lin, 2011). On the contrary, the private firms 
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have more methods to solve the agency problems, such as offering stock options to managers (Jensen & 
Meckling, 1976). Thus POE mangers are more likely to pursue long term growth of the company. 
   With regard to the domestic institutional environment, unlike POEs, SOEs are not urgent to seek 
strategic assets abroad. The reason for this is that SOE’s relationship with government or state ownership 
guarantee their access to domestic financial resource (Cull & Xu, 2003). The government tend to protect 
them from market competition. SOEs are less urgent to go abroad and seek strategic assets (e.g., 
managerial capability, knowledge, brand) to develop firm specific advantages (Cui et al., 2014). In 
contrast, POEs face less favourable domestic institutional environment and are more exposed to market 
competition. Therefore, they are more eager to escape from home institutional constraints and pursue 
growth in overseas market (Boisot & Meyer, 2008). This willingness may motivate POEs to seek 
strategic assets abroad and developed their ownership specific advantage. An interesting example is 
Geely’s acquisition of Volvo. Geely is a Chinese private owned automobile manufacture. It acquired 
Volvo’s strategic assets (global brand, technology and management expertise) to quickly catch up with 
other leading automobile manufacturers in the global market (Cui et al., 2014). 
   From a view of scale economies, compared with SOEs, POEs tend to expand abroad to benefit from 
economies of scale. SOEs are more likely to realise economies of scale in domestic market, since they 
usually hold monopolistic positions in strategic important sectors (e.g., utility) (Ju & Zhao, 2009). Thus 
they lack necessity to go global to realise economies of scale. Nonetheless, most POEs are relatively 
small and constrained by the adverse competition environment in home market (Boisot & Meyer, 2008). 
Thereby, they are more willing to escape this environment and go to other countries, realising economies 
of scale in a wider global market. 
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   Based on the perspective of organisational capability, SOEs are insufficient and slowly respond to 
market opportunities because they didn’t have to be efficient and quick before the economic reform (Ju 
& Zhao, 2009). However, POEs have already developed superior organisational capabilities in order to 
survive in the unfavourable domestic market. They are efficient in allocating available restrained 
resources (Goldeng et al., 2008) and quickly identify and respond to overseas market opportunities 
(Peng et al., 2004). 
   To sum up, though SOEs have more resources, they are inefficient in allocating resources. SOEs 
usually hold monopolistic positions in key sectors and are more likely to realise economies of scale in 
domestic market. They are less motivated and more reluctant to go abroad to seek strategic assets. POEs, 
on the other hand, are relatively efficient, responsive to overseas market opportunities, active to acquire 
foreign strategic assets and expand into overseas market to benefit from economies of scale. Hence, 
POEs are more efficient than SOEs in investing in overseas markets. 
Hypothesis 3: Private owned enterprise performs better than state owned enterprise when 
investing abroad at the same degree of multinationality. 
 
3. METHOD 
3.1 Theoretical framework 
Figure 1 presents the theoretical framework that summarises the various determinants that influence 
firm performance and the interaction between these determinants. Regarding multinationality, we 
employ OSTS1 to capture the effects of internalisation advantages on firm performance. We expect a 
positive relationship between multinationality and performance (H1). With respect to location choice, 
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we focus on different economic development across countries in the world, in particular considering 
developed and developing countries. We expect location decision of developed country rather than 
developing country enhances the performance (H2). It is argued that emerging market multinationals go 
abroad to tap into resources (e.g., finance, technology and brand), which are more abundant in developed 
country rather developing country. The risks are lower in developed countries than in developing 
countries. Also, developed countries can provide better protection on investment and intellectual 
property than developing countries. To compare the effects of different location choice, instead of using 
an integrated OSTS, we divide OSTS into two parts (OSTSD’ed and OSTSD’ing2), corresponding to two 
different host country location choices (D’ed vs. D’ing). In terms of ownership structure, it influences 
performance through multinationality. We expect a moderating effect of ownership structure on MP 
relationship, in particular considering private and state ownership. Because an ownership structure 
dummy (e.g., SOE is equal to 1 if a firm is an SOE, otherwise 0) will be automatically dropped due to 
perfect multicollinearity in pool time series cross-sectional data, we decide to use two subsamples (POEs 
vs. SOEs) and compare the results in these two subsamples to test the ownership effects. We expect that 
POEs perform better than SOEs when going abroad (H3), since POEs are more efficient than SOEs in 
identifying and responding to overseas market demand. 
------------------------------------- 
Figure 1 goes about here 
------------------------------------- 
   To estimate more precisely the effects of the aforementioned three determinants of firm performance, 
we also control several variables that are believed can affect firm performance. Firm size (measured by 
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number of employees) is expected to positively affect firm performance. Leverage (measured by debt 
to assets ratio) is expected to have a negative impact on business performance. Labour productivity 
(measured by sales to employees ratio) is believed to play a positive role in firm performance. Business 
cycles (e.g., financial crisis in 2007) are also believed to affect firm performance, thus we control 
business cycle effects (year effects). 
 
3.2 Data 
Company data are collected from Orbis dataset whose data are collected by a consultancy called Bureau 
van Dijck. According to Bureau van Dijck, the dataset Orbis is sourced from different providers. It 
provides MNEs’ detailed accounting information, parent and subsidiary links, ownership information 
and locations of subsidiaries. Some scholars use this dataset to publish papers in international business 
journals (e.g., Bhaumik et al. (2010) in Journal of International Business Studies). We select emerging 
market3 multinationals that have an ownership stake of minimum 10% (Bureau of Economic Analysis, 
1999) of its foreign subsidiaries and have information about the subsidiary location. Such that, we can 
calculate a key explanatory variable (multinationality), namely OSTS (overseas/total subsidiaries). 
Information of samples is available from 2004 to 2013. 
   We select emerging market firms that have data available on return on assets, employees, leverage, 
sales, parent’s ownership structure, parent’s equity ownership of subsidiaries and locations of 
subsidiaries. Firms with any missing value for one of these variables are excluded from our sample. In 
this panel data, on average, each firm has 2.7 years observations after deleting observations where any 
aforementioned variables have missing values. All monetary measures are reported in US dollars. The 
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final sample includes 2258 firms. Our time series cross-sectional (panel) data has advantage over pure 
cross-sectional data that are used by many prior studies, since we can exam the dynamic relationships 
within panel data, which is not possible in pure cross-sectional data (J. M. Wooldridge, 2010). 
 
3.3 The Empirical Specification 
Pooled time series cross-sectional data analysis (panel analysis) is employed to examine the role of 
multinationality on firm performance. Following the empirical specification of several scholar’s works 
(Contractor et al., 2003; Qian et al., 2008; Ruigrok et al., 2007), we use pooled time series cross-
sectional regression models to test the above three hypotheses, since we have panel data. Pooled time 
series cross-sectional data analysis has advantages over pure cross-sectional data analysis. Panel data 
analysis has two dimensions (i.e., cross-section, time-series). Thus, we can not only look at the variations 
in the first dimension, but also test the dynamic relationship in the second dimension (J. M. Wooldridge, 
2010). Panel data survey the cross section units repeatedly at regular intervals (e.g., each year), so 
usually the sample size of panel data is relatively large, which means that the estimators can be more 
precisely estimated (J. Wooldridge, 2012). Additionally, we compare the fixed effects estimates and 
random effects estimates using misspecification test. The results reject random effects application 
(Hausman, 1978). Thus pooled time series cross-sectional regression models with fixed effects 
estimators are employed. 
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   To examine the linear MP relationship (hypothesis one) and potential non-linear ones, the following 
equations are presented. 
                                                      ittitit1it e+ X+ OSTS = Y  ,                                                                   (1) 
                                            ittit
2
it3it2it e+ X+ OSTS+ OSTS = Y  ,                                               (2) 
                                  ittit
3
it6
2
it5it4it e+ X+ OSTS+ OSTS+ OSTS = Y  ,                            (3) 
in equation 2 and 3 we add the square and cubic of OSTS to equation 1 in order to detect the potential 
curvilinear (U-shaped or inverted U-shaped) and S-shaped relationship between the multinationality and 
performance.  
   To examine the impact of location decision on MP relationship (hypothesis two), the following 
equation is introduced. 
                                       ittit
ingD'
it8
edD'
it7it e+ X+ OSTS+ OSTS = Y                                           (4) 
   In equation 1, the key parameter β1, β2, β3, β4, β5 and β6 means the average change in performance 
caused by changes in multinationality. In equation 4, Β7 and β8 measure the average change in 
performance resulting from changes in foreign investments in developed and developing nations, 
respectively.  
   To examine the effect of ownership structure (private ownership vs. state ownership) on the 
relationship between multinationality and performance (hypothesis three), we divided the full sample 
into two subsample and rerun equation 1 - 4. The first subsample consists of 2112 POEs. The second 
subsample consists of 146 SOEs. The difference between the numbers of two subsample is reasonable 
because SOEs, comprising about 6% of all firms, is the minority group in emerging markets. However, 
this minority group often plays an important role in an economy, particularly in the context of emerging 
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markets (Ralston et al., 2006). 
 
Dependent variable. Yit refers to the firm performance. In this paper, it is measured by ROA (return on 
assets). In the last three decades, market-based variables4 and accounting-based variables5 have been 
used in MP studies. The market-based variables relate to market valuation of the firm according to long-
term performance, which are excluded since they are not available for all emerging economies. The 
accounting-based variables tend to be relevant to the current size of firms and measure short-term 
performance. ROA has been widely used in previous multinationality-performance literature (Lu & 
Beamish, 2004; Qian et al., 2008; Ruigrok et al., 2007). This paper chooses ROA as a measure of firm 
performance. ROA is calculated as the ratio of net income to total assets (Lu & Beamish, 2004).  
 
Explanatory variables. This paper use OSTS (overseas/total subsidiaries) as a proxy for multinationality 
(Yang et al., 2013). OSTSit is the number of overseas subsidiaries divided by total number of subsidiaries 
over the same period. Scholars use different measures6 to calculate multinationality. The most common 
measure is FSTS (foreign/total sales). One problem of this measure is that foreign sales may arise 
through FDI, but also may through non-FDI (exporting, licensing) or some other form of arm’s length 
contract. Also, after exploiting the availability in Orbis data set, we found there is difficulty in 
identifying foreign sales subtracting exporting and licensing when using FSTS measure. Thus we 
exclude FSTS. In addition, FSTS and FATA (foreign/total assets) are highly correlated (Annavarjula et 
al., 2006). Thus FATA is also ruled out. Meanwhile, OSTS is another common measure of 
multinationality. This paper employs OSTS, which is feasible because Orbis dataset has the information 
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about the numbers and location of subsidiaries.  
   In order to capture the effects of different location choices of FDI on MP relationship, particularly 
considering the developed and developing countries (Berry, 2006; Pantzalis, 2001) defined by the 
(World Bank, 2013), we create two more variables, namely OSTSitD’ed and OSTSitD’ing. OSTSitD’ed 
(OSTSitD’ing) is defined as the number of foreign subsidiaries in developed (developing) nations divided 
by total number of subsidiaries. The developed (developing) nations are defined as high-income 
(middle- and low-income) countries in the World Bank (2013). To capture the moderating effect of state 
ownership on emerging market multinationals' FDI performance, we generate the variable SOE. It is 
defined as a dummy variable (Equal to 1 if the firm is SOE, equal to 0 if the firm is non-SOE). We use 
this variable to divide the full sample into two subsamples. The first subsample contains only POEs, 
The second subsample includes only SOEs. Then we compare the differences between empirical results 
of these two subsamples. 
 
Control variables. Several variables that are known to affect business performance are controlled in the 
empirical models, represented by Xit, involving employment, leverage and sales per worker. Large firms 
tend to perform better than small firm. Small firm’s subsidiaries are more likely to exit the market (Li, 
1995). We use employment as a proxy for firm size. Employment is defined as the number of employees 
(Zahra et al., 2000). Leverage is expected to have a negative impact on firm performance, since risky 
debt results in firm’s sub-optimal investment strategy that firm has to turn down value-adding 
investment opportunities (Myers, 1977). Leverage is here defined as the debt-to-asset ratio (Qian et al., 
2008). Labour productivity is typically positively correlated with firm performance. Firms with high 
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labour productivity are more likely to have higher performance than firms with low labour productivity. 
In this paper sales per worker is defined as total sales divided by number of employees (Gaur et al., 
2014). It measures on average how much sales each worker generates. We take the natural logarithm of 
employment and sales per worker in order to normalise their distribution. In addition, firm performance 
may also be affected by unobserved macroeconomic factors over the period. Therefore, we also control 
business cycle effects by adding year dummy variables (Yang et al., 2013). 
 
4 RESULTS 
4.1 Descriptive Statistics 
In Table 1, the left panel is summary statistics, the right panel is correlation matrix. As shown in the left 
panel, regarding parent-subsidiary linkage information, on average, an emerging market multinationals 
has almost 52 percent subsidiaries locating in overseas countries. In terms of the location choice, it sets 
up 31 percent subsidiaries in overseas developed countries, 22 percent subsidiaries in overseas 
developing countries. Concerning the accounting information, on average, the return on assets is 6% for 
an emerging market MNE. An emerging market MNE has a labour force of about 10000 employees, a 
sales per worker of 1.24 million US dollars. With regard to the capital structure, 36% of a multinational’s 
assets is debt. As shown in the right panel, most of the correlation coefficients are low.  
------------------------------------- 
Table 1 goes about here 
------------------------------------- 
   Table 2 shows the country distribution and mean for most key variables used in this paper, including 
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return on assets, SOE, OSTS, OSTSD'ed, OSTSD'ing, Employment, Leverage and Sales per worker. The 
firms from country grouping of BRICS 7  (Graceffo, 2011) comprise 43.5% of the full sample. 
Unsurprisingly, the average of SOE (the ratio of number of SOEs to total number of firms) is appears to 
be low at 6%. This is reasonable because most emerging markets have alleviate governments’ control 
on economies and experienced privatisation of some SOEs. Nowadays SOEs are minority group of firms 
but still play an important role on emerging economies (Ralston et al., 2006). China, Indonesia, Russia 
and South Africa are emerging countries that have higher SOE ratios (more than 10%) than other 
countries. 
------------------------------------- 
Table 2 goes about here 
------------------------------------- 
   Figure 2 offers a better understanding of our data coverage and FDI location choices. Our data cover 
178 countries. 25 emerging countries have both parent and subsidiary information (in black). 153 
countries have only subsidiary information (in light grey). Countries with no information are in blank. 
As we can see from Figure 2, most emerging markets locate in East Asia, South Asia, Southeast Asia, 
CEE (Central and Eastern Europe), South Africa and Latin America. The emerging markets’ FDIs flow 
into developed countries (mainly in North America, Western Europe, Oceania and Japan), developing 
countries (mainly in Central Asia, Middle East and Africa) and emerging countries. 
------------------------------------- 
Figure 2 goes about here 
------------------------------------- 
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4.2 Regression Results 
Table 3 shows the main results. Column 1, 2 and 3 are to test hypothesis 1. One column represents one 
model. Model 1 to 4 correspond to equation 1 to 4. F-statistics are all significant across all columns, 
indicating all models are significant. The number of observations is 6140. There are 2258 firms that 
have an average of 2.7 years observations. Adjust R-squared is 0.176 for all models, suggesting 17.6% 
of the firm performance’s (ROA) variance can be explained by these models. All control variables are 
significant and have the expected signs. The firm size measure (employment) has a significant positive 
coefficient, suggesting bigger firms perform better than the smaller firms, which is consistent with 
previous related literature. Sales per worker also has a significant positive sign, suggesting firm with 
high labour productivity perform better than firm with low labour productivity. However, leverage has 
a significant negative sign, suggesting high leverage is detrimental to firm performance. The key 
variable of our interest is the multinationality measure OSTS. Column 1 report a significant positive 
sign of OSTS, suggesting multinationality has significant positive impact on firm performance, which 
supports our first hypothesis that there is a relationship between multinationality and performance. This 
indicates that 10% increase in OSTS leads to 0.00184 increase of Return on Assets, this economic effect 
is not small when considering that a mean of Return on Assets is 0.06. We add squared and cubic term 
in Column 2 and 3, and none of them are significant, suggesting there is no quadratic and cubic 
relationship between multinationality and performance. Overall, Column 1, 2 and 3 jointly support the 
hypothesis 1 and confirm a relationship between multinationality and performance. In particular, this 
relationship is positive linear, which is consistent with many international business literature (Goerzen 
& Beamish, 2003; Kim et al., 1993; Ramirez-Aleson & Espitia-Escuer, 2001; Zahra et al., 2000). 
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------------------------------------- 
Table 3 goes about here 
------------------------------------- 
   Column 4, 5 and 6 are to test hypothesis 2. In Column 4, we divide OSTS into two parts, namely 
OSTSD’ed and OSTSD’ing. Only developed OSTS’s coefficients is significant and positive, while 
developing OSTS’s coefficients is not significant. We interpret that developed countries’ subsidiaries 
have a significant positive effect on firm performance. Thereby hypothesis 2 is supported by the 
evidence. We split the samples into emerging market multinationals in low-tech sectors and emerging 
market multinationals in hi-tech sectors, according to Eurostat (2014) classification of hi-tech 
manufacturing and knowledge-intensive service industry according to their technological intensity at 
NACE 2-digit level. Then we re-ran the estimations and report the estimates in columns 5 and 6. We 
find that emerging market multinationals which are in low-tech sectors achieve a positive return (0.03) 
through investing in other developing countries, although the size of effect is lower than the returns from 
investing in developed countries. This positive return was not found in hi-tech sectors. Technology is 
important for hi-tech firms to compete with other firms. When hi-tech emerging market multinationals 
invest in a distant country, the institution and culture differences reduce the extent of knowledge transfer 
within the emerging market multinationals, which lowers the returns from overseas investments. 
   Overall, based on the results from Table 3, we find evidence supporting hypotheses 1 and 2. There is 
a strong and positive linear multinationality-performance relationship. Emerging market multinationals 
can benefit from investing in overseas countries. When considering different location choice, particular 
developed and developing countries as FDI host countries, we find that developed country location 
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decisions have a positive impact on firm performance, while the latter has no significant or smaller 
impact on firm performance. These results are similar to Berry (2006) and Qian et al. (2008) finding. It 
is argued that firms investing in developing countries can enjoy a cheap labour force and natural resource 
(Berry, 2006). However, there resources might overlap the resource in emerging countries. Besides, 
developing countries are associated with high risk, particularly the political risk and economic risk. 
Since emerging market multinationals are still relatively younger and smaller than developed country 
MNEs, emerging market multinationals do not have much international experience and the ability to 
manage the high risks in investing in developing countries. So it is better to first go to learn in developed 
countries where there are low risks and strong institutional protection of investment and intellectual 
property. 
   Table 4 is to test hypothesis 3, whether ownership structure matters in MP relationship. We rerun 
equation 1 to 4, but using two subsamples. We divide the full sample into two subsamples by ownership 
type. One sample consists of POEs, another sample comprises SOEs. The reason for distinguishing 
between private ownership and state ownership is that both of them play an important role in emerging 
market. The government’s control used to play or is still playing a vital role in many emerging market 
economies, such as Russia, China and transition economies (such as Central and Eastern Europe 
countries), through market intervention or equity control in SOE. Besides, POE are young and fast 
growing in emerging markets. 
------------------------------------- 
Table 4 goes about here 
------------------------------------- 
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   Column 1 and 2 report the results for private owned emerging market multinationals. We again find 
that investing in foreign countries has a significant positive linear relationship with firm performance. 
There is no evidence of curvilinear and S-shaped MP relationship, we haven’t included these results for 
brevity. With regard to location decision, similar to the results in full sample, setting up subsidiaries in 
developed countries enhances firm’s performance, while investing in developing countries does not have 
significant effect on firm performance.  
   Column 3 and 4 present the results for state owned emerging market multinationals. The number of 
observations drop substantially, which may affect the statistical significance of the results. We find no 
significant MP relationship, no matter what shape (linear, curvilinear or S-shape) of relationship it is. 
For brevity, we just report the results for linear relationship. For SOEs, we find foreign presence in either 
developed or developing countries has no significant impact on firm performance. Overall, these results 
indicate that POEs perform better than SOEs in international market. Thus hypothesis 3 is also supported. 
 
5. CONCLUSIONS 
The extant knowledge on MP relationship has been limited to MNEs from developed economies (mainly 
US firms). Few papers test the MP relationship in emerging economy context. Also, although location 
advantage is emphasised in eclectic theory, surprisingly only few papers attempts to analyse the location 
decision of MNEs. Most MP literature disregards the huge differences between developed and 
developing countries and use an aggregate multinationality measure. In this paper, FDI Location 
decisions are emphasised. Moreover, ownership structure is rarely considered in previous MP studies, 
while ownership structure plays a vital role on internationalisation, particularly considering private 
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ownership and state ownership in emerging market context, since POEs and SOEs have been influenced 
by domestic institutional environment before they go abroad. Finally, most of the data used in extant 
MP papers are cross-sectional in nature. This prevents those papers from controlling unobserved firm 
fixed effects. This also does not allow researchers to analyse the dynamic nature of the multinationality 
over time. 
   These aforementioned research gaps are filled in this paper by using a time series cross-sectional data 
from a large sample that includes 2258 multinationals from 25 emerging markets over a period from 
2004 to 2013. Our results support all three hypotheses, contributing to the existing MP literature, 
emphasising the importance of FDI location decision and highlighting the effect of ownership structure. 
First, our findings support the first hypothesis and find a significant positive linear MP relationship for 
emerging economy firms. Second, we find that emerging market multinationals' FDI activities in 
developed economies have a significant positive effect on firm performance. This is to some extent 
consistent with the works of Berry (2006) and Qian et al. (2008). Third, we find that POEs perform 
better than SOEs when going abroad. 
   Though emerging market multinationals do not have strong country-of-origin effects and competitive 
technological capability (e.g., patent, trademark and technological know-how), they have their own 
advantages such as acquisition of foreign strategic assets, diversified business group, government 
support, relational assets and the implication of catch-up strategy. Emerging market multinationals’ 
internationalisation process is very quick (Mathews, 2006). Thus emerging market multinationals 
overcome the liability of foreignness and realise the potential from internationalisation quickly. 
Emerging market multinationals are suggested to invest abroad to boost their performance, enjoying the 
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large benefits that outweigh the costs of multinationality. 
    Location choices are important concerns for emerging market multinationals. When investing in 
developed countries, emerging market multinationals can learn and develop their own technological and 
marketing capability under strong institutional protection of intellectual property and investment, which 
translated into the improved performance of emerging market multinationals. Diversifying into various 
developing countries can provide emerging market multinationals with cheap inputs (Berry, 2006) (these 
cheap inputs may already exist in emerging countries themselves). However, these advantages are offset 
by disadvantages from high risk (Berry, 2006) and huge differences among developing countries in 
terms of culture and political systems (Qian et al., 2008), making investing in developed countries a 
better location choice. Hence, regarding the strategy for FDI location, emerging market multinationals 
are advised to set up overseas subsidiaries in developed countries. Additionally, we find that emerging 
market multinationals in low-tech sectors can benefit from investing in other developing countries.  The 
extent of knowledge transfer within the emerging market multinationals is small, which lowers the 
returns from overseas investments for emerging market multinationals in hi-tech sectors. 
   Ownership structure can influence emerging market multinationals internationals’ performance. It is 
important to compare private and state ownership in emerging market context, since POSs and SOEs 
are affected by home institutional environment before they expand into foreign countries. POEs perform 
better than SOEs in foreign markets. This is because, compared with counterpart SOEs, POEs are more 
active in acquiring strategic assets (Cui et al., 2014), more efficient in allocating resources (Ju & Zhao, 
2009) and quicker in responding to overseas market opportunities (Peng et al., 2008). This suggests 
private ownership is the better ownership structure in internationalisation of emerging market 
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multinationals. In terms of location choice strategy for POEs, investment in developed countries can 
significantly improve firm performance. We believe that it is because POEs are facing unfavourable 
resource allocation environment in domestic market, where SOEs can easily obtain bank loan with 
below-the-market rate from state-owned banks while POEs cannot. This adverse competitive 
environment prompts POEs to go abroad to find financial resources. Developed countries are the better 
location choice because of their well-established financial and knowledge market. Thus the better 
location choice is the developed countries. Additionally, SOEs are suggested not to invest in either 
developing or developed countries since they cannot make a significant profit from investing abroad. 
   Nevertheless, there are some limitations of this paper. FDI is the strategic decision of firms, so the 
endogenous issue should be ruled out or alleviated. Perhaps better-performed firms are more likely to 
go abroad and can afford to establish overseas subsidiaries, suggesting there is some form of sample 
selection bias. Also, additional robustness checks would be useful.  
 
Endnotes 
1 OSTS is the number of overseas subsidiaries divided by total number of subsidiaries. More detailed discussion 
and explanation are provided in the empirical specification. 
2 OSTSD’ed (OSTSD’ing) is the number of overseas subsidiaries locating in developed (developing) nations divided 
by total number of subsidiaries. More detailed discussion and explanation are provided in the empirical 
specification. 
3 The 25 emerging countries included in this paper are a country group defined by IMF (International Monetary 
Fund). 
4 E.g., Tobin’s Q, Excess Q, 
5 E.g., ROE - return on equity, ROA - return on assets, ROS 
6 For thorough review of different measures see Asmussen et al., (2007), Hassel et al., (2003). 
7 BRICS is a major emerging economies group that includes Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa. 
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FIGURES 
 
Figure 1: Theoretical Framework of the Role of Location Choice and Ownership Structure 
 in the Multinationality-Performance Relationship 
 
Note: H1, H2 and H3 refer to hypothesis 1, 2 and 3 respectively. 
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Figure 2: Country coverage 
 
 
Note: Our data cover 178 countries. We have 25 countries with both parent and subsidiary information (in black). 
We have 153 countries with only subsidiary information (in light grey). Countries with no information are in blank.
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TABLES 
 
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics 
   Correlation matrix of variables       
Variable Mean Std. Dev. (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
ROA 0.06 0.09 1         
OSTS 0.52 0.20 0.06*** 1        
OSTSD'ed 0.31 0.25 -0.01 0.41*** 1       
OSTSD'ing 0.22 0.25 0.06*** 0.38*** -0.69*** 1      
Employment 10560.83 34621.36 0.02* 0.01 0.06*** -0.05*** 1     
Leverage 0.36 0.23 -0.34*** -0.01 0.05*** -0.05*** 0.06*** 1    
Sales p. worker 1240000.00 12200000.00 0.04*** -0.03* 0.01 -0.02* -0.02* 0.00 1   
GDP p. capita 8373.16 4685.27 0.02* 0.00 -0.27*** 0.28*** -0.15*** -0.10*** 0.01 1  
GDP growth 5.08 5.11 0.07*** -0.08*** 0.14*** -0.20*** 0.10*** 0.03** -0.01 -0.46*** 1 
Note: There are 2258 emerging market multinationals and 6140 observations. ROA is return on assets using net income, “OSTS” is the number of overseas subsidiaries divided 
by total number of subsidiaries. OSTSD'ed (OSTSD'ing) is the number of overseas subsidiaries locating in developed (developing) nations divided by total number of subsidiaries.  
“Employment” is the number of employees. “Leverage” is the debt to assets ratio. “Sales p. worker” is sales per worker, measured by total sales to number of employees. “GDP 
p. capita” is GDP per capita. All monetary variables are in millions of US dollars. Significance levels: *0.1; **0.05; ***0.01 
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Table 2: Number of firms and key variables by emerging market multinationals’ home country 
Country N SOE ROA OSTS OSTSD'ed OSTSD'ing Employment Leverage Sales p. worker GDP p. capita GDP growth 
Argentina 12 0.08 0.13 0.46 0.12 0.34 5162.67 0.28 13500000.00 12921.43 7.62 
Brazil 132 0.03 0.05 0.56 0.32 0.24 15389.81 0.47 984230.56 11277.35 4.09 
Bulgaria 96 0.02 0.04 0.47 0.21 0.26 380.97 0.34 281997.63 6921.43 1.25 
Chile 30 0.00 0.05 0.58 0.13 0.45 4435.16 0.44 4400000.00 13397.78 5.37 
China 535 0.17 0.04 0.46 0.36 0.10 18042.37 0.38 1090000.00 4648.82 9.65 
Colombia 23 0.04 0.06 0.51 0.16 0.36 4819.26 0.29 9040000.00 6219.67 4.82 
Estonia 174 0.00 0.08 0.50 0.06 0.45 310.96 0.27 350228.25 15531.09 2.18 
Hungary 112 0.00 0.05 0.55 0.25 0.29 2032.85 0.26 2610000.00 13236.19 -0.21 
India 156 0.04 0.08 0.66 0.49 0.16 15203.45 0.39 474301.41 1298.55 7.45 
Indonesia 46 0.17 0.05 0.52 0.36 0.16 7940.76 0.47 717857.44 2723.45 5.81 
Latvia 129 0.02 0.06 0.51 0.25 0.26 221.42 0.40 413754.13 13370.09 1.92 
Lithuania 105 0.02 0.07 0.55 0.21 0.34 506.06 0.36 3790000.00 13184.84 1.91 
Malaysia 64 0.14 0.05 0.58 0.43 0.15 12260.21 0.38 297317.97 7044.96 5.41 
Mexico 45 0.00 0.05 0.48 0.32 0.16 22720.14 0.40 292517.84 8733.68 0.83 
Pakistan 3 0.00 0.18 0.45 0.25 0.20 16857.25 0.15 158996.53 918.66 6.11 
Peru 5 0.00 0.10 0.42 0.05 0.37 3004.14 0.31 278768.94 5012.62 6.52 
Philippines 39 0.00 0.07 0.60 0.29 0.31 7568.84 0.38 1980000.00 2170.92 5.23 
Poland 282 0.03 0.06 0.52 0.35 0.18 1866.17 0.30 420189.91 12150.42 3.92 
Romania 25 0.04 0.01 0.45 0.18 0.27 5136.92 0.33 861800.81 8099.65 2.19 
Russia 68 0.10 0.06 0.41 0.27 0.14 45221.89 0.41 1440000.00 10681.54 3.16 
South Africa 91 0.00 0.07 0.71 0.34 0.37 15893.85 0.36 237623.02 6617.32 2.65 
Thailand 23 0.09 0.09 0.52 0.32 0.20 6073.08 0.34 477160.38 3151.02 5.04 
Turkey 49 0.00 0.04 0.52 0.35 0.17 9289.70 0.45 2510000.00 9776.12 4.04 
Ukraine 13 0.00 0.06 0.36 0.18 0.17 5356.46 0.41 2050000.00 3060.04 1.47 
Venezuela 1 0.00 0.04 0.33 0.00 0.33 650.00 0.22 320000000.00 8329.65 8.75 
Note: N is the number of firms. SOE refers to the ratio of number of SOEs to total number of firms. ROA is return on assets using net income, “OSTS” is the number of overseas 
subsidiaries divided by total number of subsidiaries. OSTSD’ed (OSTSD’ing) is the number of overseas subsidiaries locating in developed (developing) nations divided by total 
number of subsidiaries. “Employment” is the number of employees. “Leverage” is the debt to assets ratio. “Sales p. worker” is sales per worker, measured by total sales to 
number of employees. “GDP p. capita” is GDP per capita. All monetary variables are in millions of US dollars. 
  38 
Table 3: Multinationality and Performance; the Role of Location Choice 
 
All Emerging Multinationals 
 
Emerging Multinationals 
low-tech sectors hi-tech sectors 
 (1) (2) (3) (4)    (5) (6)    
OSTS 0.0178* 0.0036 -0.0060                                  
 (0.010) (0.011) (0.012)                                  
OSTS2  0.0123* 0.0903                                  
  (0.007) (0.057)                                  
OSTS3   -0.0668                                  
   (0.049)                                  
OSTSD'ed    0.0286**  0.0487*** -0.0008    
    (0.011)    (0.015) (0.019)    
OSTSD'ing    0.0073    0.0325** -0.0300    
    (0.011)    (0.013) (0.019)    
Employment 0.0180*** 0.0182*** 0.0184*** 0.0181*** 0.0218*** 0.0144*   
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)    (0.007) (0.009)    
Leverage -0.1715*** -0.1711*** -0.1711*** -0.1715*** -0.1992*** -0.1377*** 
 (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014)    (0.021) (0.021)    
Sales per worker 0.0217*** 0.0219*** 0.0221*** 0.0219*** 0.0334*** 0.0131    
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)    (0.009) (0.008)    
GDP per capita 0.0309*** 0.0303*** 0.0296*** 0.0301*** 0.0316** 0.0205    
 (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010)    (0.013) (0.016)    
GDP growth 0.0029*** 0.0029*** 0.0029*** 0.0029*** 0.0026*** 0.0041*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)    (0.001) (0.001)    
Adj R-squared 0.176 0.176 0.177 0.176    0.214 0.132    
No. observation 6140 6140 6140 6140    3005 2164    
F statistics 24.392 23.074 21.792 23.172    16.535 5.653    
 Note: ROA (return on assets using net income) is the dependent variable, “OSTS” is the number of overseas subsidiaries divided by total number of subsidiaries. OSTSD'ed 
(OSTSD'ing) is the number of overseas subsidiaries locating in developed (developing) nations divided by total number of subsidiaries. “Employment” is the natural logarithm 
of the number of employees. “Leverage” is the debt to assets ratio. “Sales per worker” is sales per worker, measured by natural logarithm of the ratio of total sales to number of 
employees. Columns 1-4 include full sample. Columns 5 includes emerging market multinationals in low-tech sectors. Column 6 includes emerging market multinationals in 
hi-tech sectors. All monetary variables are in millions of US dollars. Values in parentheses are robust standard errors. Significance levels: *0.1; **0.05; ***0.01. 
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Table 4: The Role of Ownership Structure 
 
Private Owned Enterprises 
 
State Owned Enterprises 
(1) (2) (3) (4)    
OSTS 0.0186*  0.0182                 
 (0.010)  (0.019)                 
OSTSD'ed  0.0305**  0.0268    
  (0.012)  (0.021)    
OSTSD'ing  0.0082  -0.0025    
  (0.011)  (0.021)    
Employment 0.0186*** 0.0186*** 0.0139** 0.0141**  
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)    
Leverage -0.1728*** -0.1730*** -0.1567*** -0.1563*** 
 (0.015) (0.015) (0.031) (0.031)    
Sales per worker 0.0216*** 0.0218*** 0.0216*** 0.0225*** 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.008)    
GDP per capita 0.0317*** 0.0309*** -0.0373 -0.0393    
 (0.010) (0.010) (0.031) (0.030)    
GDP growth 0.0030*** 0.0031*** 0.0000 -0.0001    
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001)    
Adj R-squared 0.176 0.176 0.212 0.214    
No. observation 5642 5642 498 498    
F statistics 22.840 21.637 4.822 4.798    
Note: ROA (return on assets using net income) is the dependent variable, “OSTS” is the number of overseas 
subsidiaries divided by total number of subsidiaries. OSTSD'ed (OSTSD'ing) is the number of overseas subsidiaries 
locating in developed (developing) nations divided by total number of subsidiaries. “Employment” is the natural 
logarithm of the number of employees. “Leverage” is the debt to assets ratio. “Sales per worker” is sales per worker, 
measured by natural logarithm of the ratio of total sales to number of employees. Columns 1 and 2 include POEs. 
Columns 3 and 4 include SOEs. All monetary variables are in millions of US dollars. Values in parentheses are 
robust standard errors. Significance levels: *0.1; **0.05; ***0.01. 
 
 40 
 
References 
Al-Obaidan, A. M., & Scully, G. W. (1993). The economic efficiency of backward vertical 
integration in the international petroleum refining industry. Applied economics, 25(12), 
1529-1539.  
Annavarjula, M., Beldona, S., & Sadrieh, F. (2006). Corporate performance implications of 
multinationality: The role of firm specific moderators. Journal of Transnational 
Management, 10(4), 5-33.  
Berry, H. (2006). Shareholder valuation of foreign investment and expansion. Strategic 
Management Journal, 27(12), 1123-1140.  
Beugelsdijk, S., McCann, P., & Mudambi, R. (2010). Introduction: place, space and 
organization—economic geography and the multinational enterprise. Journal of 
Economic Geography, 10(4), 485-493.  
Bhaumik, S. K., Driffield, N., & Pal, S. (2010). Does ownership structure of emerging-market 
firms affect their outward FDI&quest; The case of the Indian automotive and 
pharmaceutical sectors. Journal of International Business Studies, 41(3), 437-450.  
Boisot, M., & Meyer, M. W. (2008). Which Way through the Open Door? Reflections on the 
Internationalization of Chinese Firms. Management and Organization Review, 4(3), 349-
365.  
Buckley, P. J., & Casson, M. (2003). The future of the multinational enterprise in retrospect 
and in prospect. Journal of International Business Studies, 219-222.  
Bureau of Economic Analysis, U. S. D. o. C. (1999). Methodologies for direct U.S. 
investment abroad. International Direct Investment Studies by the Bureau of Economic 
Analysis.  Washington, DC.: U.S. Government Printing Office. 
Cai, K. G. (1999). Outward foreign direct investment: A novel dimension of China's 
integration into the regional and global economy. The China Quarterly, 160, 856-880.  
Chen, Y. Y., & Young, M. N. (2010). Cross-border mergers and acquisitions by Chinese 
listed companies: A principal–principal perspective. Asia Pacific Journal of Management, 
27(3), 523-539.  
Child, J., & Rodrigues, S. B. (2005). The internationalization of Chinese firms: A case for 
theoretical extension?[1]. Management and Organization Review, 1(3), 381-410.  
Choi, C. J., Lee, S. H., & Kim, J. B. (1999). A note on countertrade: contractual uncertainty 
and transaction governance in emerging economies. Journal of International Business 
Studies, 189-201.  
Contractor, F. J. (2007). Is international business good for companies? The evolutionary or 
multi-stage theory of internationalization vs. the transaction cost perspective. 
Management International Review, 47(3), 453-475.  
Contractor, F. J., Kundu, S. K., & Hsu, C.-C. (2003). A three-stage theory of international 
expansion: The link between multinationality and performance in the service sector. 
Journal of International Business Studies, 34(1), 5-18.  
Cui, L., & Jiang, F. (2012). State ownership effect on firms' FDI ownership decisions under 
institutional pressure: A study of Chinese outward-investing firms. Journal of 
International Business Studies, 43(3), 264-284.  
Cui, L., Meyer, K. E., & Hu, H. W. (2014). What drives firms’ intent to seek strategic assets 
 41 
 
by foreign direct investment? A study of emerging economy firms. Journal of World 
Business, 49(4), 488-501.  
Cull, R., & Xu, L. C. (2003). Who gets credit? The behavior of bureaucrats and state banks in 
allocating credit to Chinese state-owned enterprises. Journal of Development Economics, 
71(2), 533-559.  
Doukas, J., & Travlos, N. G. (1988). The effect of corporate multinationalism on 
shareholders' wealth: Evidence from international acquisitions. Journal of Finance, 1161-
1175.  
Dunning, J. H. (1988). The theory of international production. The International Trade 
Journal, 3(1), 21-66.  
Dunning, J. H. (2002). Relational assets, networks and international business activity. 
Cooperative strategies and alliances, 569-593.  
Elango, B., & Pattnaik, C. (2011). Learning Before Making the Big Leap. Management 
International Review, 51(4), 461-481.  
Eurostat. (2014). Eurostat indicators of High-tech industry and knowledge-intensive services.  
Luxembourg: Statistical Office of the European Union. 
Gaur, A. S., & Kumar, V. (2009). International diversification, business group affiliation and 
firm performance: Empirical evidence from India*. British Journal of Management, 
20(2), 172-186.  
Gaur, A. S., Yang, Y., & Singh, D. A. (2014). Foreign Subsidiary Location Strategy and 
Financial Performance: A Global Value Chain Perspective. Paper presented at the 
Academy of Management Proceedings. 
Goerzen, A., & Beamish, P. W. (2003). Geographic scope and multinational enterprise 
performance. Strategic Management Journal, 24(13), 1289-1306.  
Goldeng, E., Grünfeld, L. A., & Benito, G. R. (2008). The performance differential between 
private and state owned enterprises: The roles of ownership, management and market 
structure. Journal of Management Studies, 45(7), 1244-1273.  
Graceffo, A. (2011). BRIC becomes BRICS: changes on the geopolitical chessboard. Foreign 
Policy Journal. Retrieved, 04-14.  
Guillén, M. F., & Garcia-Canal, E. (2009). The American model of the multinational firm and 
the “new” multinationals from emerging economies. The Academy of Management 
Perspectives, 23(2), 23-35.  
Hausman, J. A. (1978). Specification tests in econometrics. Econometrica: Journal of the 
Econometric Society, 1251-1271.  
Hennart, J.-F. (2007). The theoretical rationale for a multinationality-performance 
relationship. Management International Review, 47(3), 423-452.  
Hitt, M. A., Dacin, M. T., Levitas, E., Arregle, J.-L., & Borza, A. (2000). Partner selection in 
emerging and developed market contexts: Resource-based and organizational learning 
perspectives. Academy of Management journal, 43(3), 449-467.  
Hymer, S. H. (1976). The international operations of national firms: A study of direct foreign 
investment (Vol. 14): MIT press Cambridge, MA. 
Jensen, M. C., & Meckling, W. H. (1976). Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency 
costs and ownership structure. Journal of financial economics, 3(4), 305-360.  
 42 
 
Johanson, J., & Vahlne, J.-E. (1977). The internationalization process of the firm-a model of 
knowledge development and increasing foreign market commitments. Journal of 
International Business Studies, 23-32.  
Ju, M., & Zhao, H. (2009). Behind organizational slack and firm performance in China: The 
moderating roles of ownership and competitive intensity. Asia Pacific Journal of 
Management, 26(4), 701-717.  
Khanna, T., & Palepu, K. (1997). Why focused strategies may be wrong for emerging 
markets. Harvard business review, 75, 41-54.  
Khanna, T., & Palepu, K. G. (2006). Emerging giants: Building world-class compaines in 
developing countries. Harvard business review, 84(10).  
Kim, W. C., Hwang, P., & Burgers, W. P. (1993). Multinationals' diversification and the 
risk‐return trade‐off. Strategic Management Journal, 14(4), 275-286.  
Krugman, P. (1980). Scale economies, product differentiation, and the pattern of trade. The 
American Economic Review, 950-959.  
Lecraw, D. (1977). Direct investment by firms from less developed countries. Oxford 
Economic Papers, 442-457.  
Li, J. (1995). Foreign entry and survival: Effects of strategic choices on performance in 
international markets. Strategic Management Journal, 16(5), 333-351.  
Lin, N. (2011). Capitalism in China: A centrally managed capitalism (CMC) and its future. 
Management and Organization Review, 7(1), 63-96.  
Lin, X. (2010). State versus private MNCs from China: initial conceptualizations. 
International Marketing Review, 27(3), 366-380.  
Lu, J. W., & Beamish, P. W. (2004). International diversification and firm performance: The 
S-curve hypothesis. Academy of Management journal, 47(4), 598-609.  
Majocchi, A., & Strange, R. (2012). International Diversification. Management International 
Review, 1-22.  
Makino, S., Lau, C.-M., & Yeh, R.-S. (2002). Asset-exploitation versus asset-seeking: 
Implications for location choice of foreign direct investment from newly industrialized 
economies. Journal of International Business Studies, 403-421.  
Martins, P. S., & Yang, Y. (2009). The impact of exporting on firm productivity: a meta-
analysis of the learning-by-exporting hypothesis. Review of World Economics, 145(3), 
431-445.  
Mathews, J. A. (2006). Dragon multinationals: New players in 21st century globalization. 
Asia Pacific Journal of Management, 23(1), 5-27.  
Myers, S. C. (1977). Determinants of corporate borrowing. Journal of financial economics, 
5(2), 147-175.  
Okhmatovskiy, I. (2010). Performance implications of ties to the government and SOEs: A 
political embeddedness perspective. Journal of Management Studies, 47(6), 1020-1047.  
Pantzalis, C. (2001). Does location matter? An empirical analysis of geographic scope and 
MNC market valuation. Journal of International Business Studies, 32(1), 133-155.  
Peng, M. W., Tan, J., & Tong, T. W. (2004). Ownership types and strategic groups in an 
emerging economy*. Journal of Management Studies, 41(7), 1105-1129.  
Peng, M. W., Wang, D. Y. L., & Jiang, Y. (2008). An institution-based view of international 
 43 
 
business strategy: a focus on emerging economies. Journal of International Business 
Studies, 39(5), 920-936.  
Porter, M. E. (1990). The competitive advantage of nations. Harvard business review, 68(2), 
73-93.  
Qian, G., Li, L., Li, J., & Qian, Z. (2008). Regional diversification and firm performance. 
Journal of International Business Studies, 39(2), 197-214.  
Ralston, D. A., Terpstra-Tong, J., Terpstra, R. H., Wang, X., & Egri, C. (2006). Today's state-
owned enterprises of China: are they dying dinosaurs or dynamic dynamos? Strategic 
Management Journal, 27(9), 825-843.  
Ramirez-Aleson, M., & Espitia-Escuer, M. A. (2001). The effect of international 
diversification strategy on the performance of Spanish-based firms during the period 
1991-1995. Management International Review, 291-315.  
Rugman, A. M. (1976). Risk reduction by international diversification. Journal of 
International Business Studies, 75-80.  
Ruigrok, W., Amann, W., & Wagner, H. (2007). The internationalization-performance 
relationship at Swiss firms: A test of the S-shape and extreme degrees of 
internationalization. Management International Review, 47(3), 349-368.  
Sundaram, A. K., & Black, J. S. (1992). The environment and internal organization of 
multinational enterprises. Academy of Management Review, 17(4), 729-757.  
UNCTAD. (2006). World Investment Report. New York: United Nations. 
UNCTAD. (2014). World Investment Report. New York: United Nations. 
Wooldridge, J. (2012). Introductory econometrics: A modern approach: Cengage Learning. 
Wooldridge, J. M. (2010). Econometric analysis of cross section and panel data: MIT press. 
World Bank. (2013). World Development Indicators 2013. Washington, DC.: World Bank 
Publications. 
Xu, D., & Shenkar, O. (2002). Note: Institutional distance and the multinational enterprise. 
Academy of Management Review, 27(4), 608-618.  
Yang, Y., & Driffield, N. (2012). Multinationality-performance relationship. Management 
International Review, 52(1), 23-47.  
Yang, Y., Martins, P. S., & Driffield, N. (2013). Multinational Performance and the 
Geography of FDI. Management International Review, 53(6), 763-794.  
Zaheer, S., & Mosakowski, E. (1997). The dynamics of the liability of foreignness: A global 
study of survival in financial services. Strategic Management Journal, 18(6), 439-463.  
Zahra, S. A., Ireland, R. D., & Hitt, M. A. (2000). International expansion by new venture 
firms: International diversity, mode of market entry, technological learning, and 
performance. Academy of Management journal, 43(5), 925-950.  
Zou, H., & Adams, M. B. (2008). Corporate ownership, equity risk and returns in the People's 
Republic of China. Journal of International Business Studies, 39(7), 1149-1168.  
 
 
 
